



ABSTRACT. In cooperative games in which the players are partitioned
into groups, we study the incentives of the members of a group to leave it and
become singletons. In this context, we model a non-cooperative mechanism
in which each player has to decide whether to stay in his group or to exit and
act as a singleton. We show that players, acting myopically, always reach a
Nash equilibrium.
KEYWORDS: Cooperative games, coalition structure, Owen value, game
theory, Nash equilibrium
1. INTRODUCTION
Endogenous formation of coalitions has been widely studied in the game
theory literature. For example, Chatterjee et al. (1993) and Okada (1996)
study coalition formation models in which players can agree on payoﬀ division
at the time they form a coalition.
1Latest version at: http://webs.uvigo.es/vidalpuga/.
1In these models, the coalitions are formed along with the ﬁnal payoﬀ of
their members. An alternative approach is to assume that the ﬁnal payoﬀ
is given by the coalition structure. For example, Hart and Kurz (1983) and
Bloch (1996) present models of endogenous formation of coalitions in two
stages: in the ﬁrst stage, players decide the coalition structure. In the second
stage, the ﬁnal payoﬀ is given according to the chosen coalition structure. In
Hart and Kurz’s model, the ﬁnal payoﬀ is given by the Owen value (Owen
(1977)). A similar model is given by Aumann and Myerson (1988), where
players decide how to connect through a graph, and the ﬁnal payoﬀ is given
by the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) depending on the particular graph.
On the other hand, there are many situations in which the coalition struc-
ture is given ap r i o r i . For example, consider the members of a Parliament.
Even though all have the same rights, they do not act independently, since
they belong to diﬀerent political parties. Other examples include wage bar-
gaining between ﬁrms and labor unions, tariﬀ bargaining between countries,
bargaining between the member states of a federated country, etc. Broadly
speaking, these coalitions negotiate among them as single agents. The fun-
damental feature is that the coalition structure is exogenously given by the
problem, which means that players do not choose which coalition they belong
to.
In this paper, we take an intermediate approach between the endogenous
and the exogenous coalition structure models. We assume that there exists a
prior coalition structure (exogenous), but players inside ap r i o r iunion may
have the chance to free ride and act as singletons (endogenous). For example,
consider the parties with representation in the European Parliament. Some
of these parties may decide, prior to the discussion of an issue, to collude and
defend a common policy. By doing so, they join forces and act as a single
party.
Usually, this cooperation is useful because the colluded party is stronger
t h a nt h es u mo ft h ei n d i v i d u a lp a r t i e s . I tm a yh a p p e n ,h o w e v e r ,t h a tt h i s
cooperation is not beneﬁcial, as the "joint-bargaining paradox" of Harsanyi
2(1977) shows. The paradox is that an individual can be worse oﬀ bargaining
as a member of a coalition than bargaining alone. Chae and Heidhues (2004,
p. 47) justify this paradox as follows: Treatening a group as a single bargainer
reduces multiple “rights to talk” to a single right and thereby beneﬁts the
outsiders.
Supranational parties such like the EPP-ED1 or the Socialist Group usu-
ally do not act as single agents, because its members are not committed to
follow the same policies on the same issues. Instead, these supranational
associations provide a common working environment is which cooperation
agreements are easier to settle, but only if they are beneﬁcial for everyone.
In this framework, we deﬁne a mechanism in two stages: in the ﬁrst stage,
players simultaneously announce whether they stay or exit their coalition.
The decision to stay is interpreted as the agreement to act as a single player
in the second stage. The players who decide to leave their coalition act as
singletons. In the second stage, the ﬁnal payoﬀ is given by the Owen value.
In games with coalition structure, the Owen value is a relevant solution
concept. It has been supported axiomatically (Owen (1977), Hart and Hurz
(1983, 1984), Winter (1992), Calvo et al. (1996)) and also non-cooperatively
(Vidal-Puga and Bergantiños (2003)). Moreover, it has been successfully
applied to cost allocation problems (Vázquez-Brage et al. (1997)) and po-
litical situations (Carreras and Owen (1988, 1993), Ono and Muto (2001)).
Vidal-Puga (2005) also shows that the Owen value arises in equilibrium of
a non-cooperative game that models the bargaining among heterogeneous
groups.
Hence, it seems justiﬁable to assume that, once the coalition structure
is formed, the ﬁnal payoﬀ is given by the Owen value. Notice that this
assumption is also made by Hart and Kurz (1983).
In Sections 2 and 3 we present the notation and the model of coalition
formation. We are interested in ﬁnding the stability of the resulting coalition
structure. We focus on the incentives of each player to stay or leave his
group. These incentives are given by the diﬀerence between what they get
3by changing their strategies and what they get by not doing it. In Section 3,
we show that these diﬀerences are independent of the order in which players
move. As a consequence, there are no cycles. Players, acting myopically, can
reach a Nash equilibrium. In Section 4, we study a possible generalization of
the model.
2. PRELIMINARIES
We consider a coalitional game as a pair (N,v) with a ﬁnite set of players
N = {1,2,...,n} and a characteristic function v :2 N → R with v(∅)=0 .
Following usual practice, we often refer to “the game v” instead of “the
coalitional game (N,v)”.
Given two games v, w,l e tv + w deﬁne the game (v + w)(S)=v(S)+
w(S) for all S ⊂ N.
Given a scalar α and a game v,l e tαv deﬁne the game (αv)(S)=αv(S)
for all S ⊂ N.
Given a coalition T ⊂ N,w ed e ﬁne the unanimity game (N,uT) with
carrier T as the coalitional game given by
uT (S)=
(
1 if T ⊂ S
0 otherwise.
According to Harsanyi (1959), unanimity games form a basis for the space











for all T ⊂ N.
4A coalition structure over N is a partition P = {S1,...,Sp} on the set of






for all B ⊂ P.T h u s ,v/P is the game played by the coalitions in P.
We denote the set of all games (N,v,P) over N with coalition structure
as CTU(N).
A value is a function Ψ : CTU(N) → RN that assigns to each cooperative
game with coalition structure (N,v,P) av e c t o ri nRN,s ot h a tΨi (N,v,P)
represents the payoﬀ assigned to player i ∈ N. With a slight abuse of nota-
tion, we say that Ψi (N,v,P) is the value of player i.
Let Π be the set of permutations of the elements of N.W e s a y t h a t
π ∈ Π is compatible with P if the members of the same coalition are together.
We denote the set of all permutations compatible with P as ΠP ⊂ Π.N a m e l y ,
π ∈ ΠP if and only if it satisﬁes:
∀i,j ∈ Sq ∈ P,∀k ∈ Nπ (i) <π (k) <π (j)= ⇒ k ∈ Sq.
Given π ∈ Π,w ed e ﬁne
Pr(i,π): ={j ∈ N : π(j) <π (i)}
as the set of predecessors of i with respect to π.






[v(Pr(i,π) ∪ {i}) − v(Pr(i,π))].
W h e nt h eg a m ei sc l e a r ,w eu s eΦ(P) instead of the more cumbersome
Φ(N,v,P).
We consider the Owen value as a solution of the game. A characterization
of the Owen value is given by Owen (1977) as follows. The Owen value is
the only function Φ : CTU(N) → RN satisfying the following axioms:
1. Eﬃciency:
P
i∈N Φi(P)=v(N) for each (N,v,P) ∈ CTU(N).
52. Symmetry in each union:
v(S ∪ {i})=v(S ∪ {j}),∀S ⊂ N\{i,j} =⇒ Φi(P)=Φj(P)
for all i,j ∈ Sq ∈ P.
3. Symmetry in the quotient game:







for all Sq,S r ∈ P.
4. Null player:
v(S ∪ {i})=v(S),∀S ⊂ N\{i} =⇒ Φi(P)=0
for all i ∈ N.
5. Additivity:
Φ(N,v + w,P)=Φ(N,v,P)+Φ(N,w,P)
for all (N,v,P),(N,w,P) ∈ CTU(N).
Given a unanimity game uT with carrier T ⊂ N, Property 4 implies that
Φi (P)=0for all i/ ∈ T.
3. THE MODEL
Let (N,v,P) be a game with coalition structure. Fix Sq ∈ P.W ec o n s i d e r
the following mechanism2 in two stages for players in Sq:
First stage Simultaneously, each player in Sq announces whether he wants
to stay or to exit the coalition. Given the announcements of each player,
a coalition structure is formed. The players who announced to exit act
as singletons.
6Second stage Each player receives his Owen value.
Thus, the set of strategies for each player is {s,e},w h e r e‘ s’m e a n s“ t o
stay” and ‘e’ means “to exit”. We work only with pure strategies. Let
γ (i) ∈ {s,e} be the strategy of player i.L e t γ =( γ (i))i∈Sq be a strategy





∪ {{i}}i∈Sq:γ(i)=e ∪ {Sr}r6=q .
In particular, if γ (i)=s for all i ∈ Sq,w eh a v ePγ = P.
The ﬁnal payoﬀ for the players is given by the Owen value under this
coalition structure Φ(Pγ).
Example 1 Let 3 P = {123|45|6} and Sq = {1,2,3}. Assume γ (1) =
γ (2) = s and γ (3) = e.T h e n , Pγ = {12|3|45|6}. Assume γ0 (1) = s
and γ0 (3) = γ0 (2) = e.T h e n ,Pγ0 = {1|2|3|45|6}.A s s u m eγ00 (1) = γ00 (2) =
γ00 (3) = e.T h e n ,Pγ00 = {1|2|3|45|6}.
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle γ is a panic equilibrium if γ (i)=e for all i ∈ Sq.A
panic equilibrium is clearly a Nash equilibrium, because the coalition struc-
ture does not change by the individual deviation of a player.
Remark 2 Assume that players begin playing γ with γ (i)=s for some i,
and change their strategies myopically. This means that they sequentially
change their strategies only if the payoﬀ in the new coalition structure is
larger for them. Then, it is straightforward to check that a panic equilibrium
cannot be reached following this myopic behavior.
Given a strategy proﬁle γ,w es a yt h a tPγ derives from P,a n di ti s
a derived coalition structure. We say that two strategy proﬁles γ and γ0
are adjacent through i ∈ Sq,a n dw ew r i t eγ ∼i γ0,i fγ(j)=γ0(j) for all
j ∈ Sq\{i}and γ(i) 6= γ0(i).W et h e nc a l lp l a y e ri the link between γ and γ0.
We say that γ and γ0 are adjacent,a n dw ew r i t eγ ∼ γ0, if there exists a link
i ∈ Sq such that γ ∼i γ0. Two derived coalition structures Pγ and Pγ0 are
7adjacent through i if their respective strategy proﬁles γ and γ0 are adjacent
through i.A l s o ,Pγ and Pγ0 are adjacent if there exists a link i such that Pγ
and Pγ0 are adjacent through i. We denote these as Pγ ∼i Pγ0 and Pγ ∼ Pγ0,
respectively.
Example 3 Let P = {123}, P1 = {12|3},a n dP2 = {1|2|3}.T h e n ,P, P1
and P2 derive from P.M o r e o v e r , P and P1 are adjacent. Player 3 is the
link between P and P1. Similarly, P1 and P2 are adjacent, and they have two
possible links, player 1 or player 2. However, P and P2 are not adjacent.
Notice that two adjacent derived coalition structures may be equal, as
the next example shows.
Example 4 Let P = {12}, γ(1) = γ(2) = e, γ0(1) = e, γ0(2) = s.T h e n ,
Pγ ∼ Pγ0 and Pγ = Pγ0 = {1|2}. However, γ 6= γ0.
A path over P is an ordered list of strategy proﬁles = =[ γ0,γ1,...,γm]
such that γl−1 ∼ γl for all l =1 ,...,m.W e s a y t h a t = has length m.I f
γm = γ0,w es a yt h a t= is a closed path.L e t [i1,i 2,...,i m] be the list of
links between the strategy proﬁles, i.e. γl−1 ∼il γl for all l =1 ,...,m.L e t
[P0,P 1,...,Pm] be the list of coalition structures derived from =,i . e .Pl = Pγl
for all l =0 ,1,...,m.
Deﬁnition 5 Given a value Ψ, we say that a closed path = =[ γ0,γ1,...,γm]
is a cycle for Ψ if Ψil (Pl−1) < Ψil (Pl) for all l =1 ,2,...,m,w h e r ePl = Pγl
is the coalition structure derived from γl and il is the link between γl−1 and
γl,f o ra l ll =1 ,2,...,m.
Example 6 Let P = {123} and v({1,2,3})=3 0 .L e t Ψ be a value such
that Ψ(P)=( 1 0 ,10,10). If the coalition structure is Pγ = {12|3},t h e
players get Ψ(Pγ)=( 4 ,11,15).I fPγ = {1|23}, they get Ψ(Pγ)=( 1 1 ,4,15).
If Pγ = {13|2},t h e yg e tΨ(Pγ)=( 1 5 ,4,11).I f Pγ = {1|2|3}, they get
Ψ(Pγ)=( 1 0 ,10,10). Then, every coalition structure belongs to a cycle4.
Moreover, the only Nash equilibrium is the panic equilibrium (see Figure 1).
8γ = (s,s,s), Pγ = {123}
Φ(Pγ) = (10, 10, 10)
γ = (e,s,s), Pγ = {1|23}
Φ(Pγ) = (11, 4, 15)
γ = (s,s,e), Pγ = {12|3}
Φ(Pγ) = (4, 11, 15)
γ = (s,e,s), Pγ = {13|2}
Φ(Pγ) = (15, 4, 11)
γ = (e,e,s), Pγ = {1|2|3}
Φ(Pγ) = (10, 10, 10)
γ = (e,s,e), Pγ = {1|2|3}
Φ(Pγ) = (10, 10, 10)
γ = (s,e,e), Pγ = {1|2|3}
Φ(Pγ) = (10, 10, 10)
γ = (e,e,e), Pγ = {1|2|3}
Φ(Pγ) = (10, 10, 10)
13 2





Figure 1: The arrows represent the adjacent strategy proﬁles. The number
next to each arrow indicates the link. Each arrow points to the strategy
proﬁle that increases the payoﬀ of the link. Notice that the panic equilibrium
(e,e,e) is not reachable by the arrows (see Remark 2).
9We study the existence of cycles for the Owen value. Hence, from now
on, when we say cycle, we mean cycle for Φ.
The existence of cycles indicates an instability in the mechanism, as the
next lemma shows:
Lemma 7 If the only Nash equilibrium is the panic equilibrium, then there
exists a cycle.
Proof. Assume the only Nash equilibrium is the panic equilibrium and there
are no cycles. Let γ0 be a strategy proﬁle that is not the panic equilibrium.
Then, there exists a player i1 ∈ Sq who beneﬁts from changing his strategy
γ0(i1).L e t γ1 be the adjacent strategy proﬁle (i.e. γ0 ∼i1 γ1)a n dl e tP0
and P1 be their respective coalition structures (i.e. P0 = Pγ0 and P1 = Pγ1).
By Remark 2, γ1 is not the panic equilibrium. Moreover, Φi1(P0) < Φi1(P1).
Since γ1 is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists another player i2 ∈ Sq who
beneﬁts from changing γ1(i2).L e tγ2 be the adjacent strategy proﬁle and let
P2 be its derived coalition structure. Then, γ2 is not the panic equilibrium,
and Φi2(P1) < Φi2(P2). We repeat the process with all the players who are
willing to change their strategies. Since there exist no cycles, we cannot come
back to a previous strategy proﬁle. So, there should be a strategy proﬁle γm
(which is not the panic equilibrium) in which no player can improve his payoﬀ
by changing his strategy, i.e. γm is a Nash equilibrium. This contradiction
proves the result.





[Φil(Pl) − Φil(Pl−1)] (1)
where Pl = Pγl is the coalition structure derived from γl,a n dil is the link
between γl−1 and γl,f o ra l ll =1 ,2,...,m.
Notice that each term in (1) represents the amount by which a player il
improves his payoﬀ when the strategy proﬁle changes from γl−1 to γl,w h i c h
i st h ec h a n g et h a th ei sc a p a b l et od o .
10γ0(i1) = γ0(i2) = s
γ3(i1) = s, γ3(i2) = e
γ1(i1) = e, γ1(i2) = s





Figure 2: T =[ γ0,γ1,γ2,γ3,γ0] is a closed path of length 4.
Lemma 9 The diﬀerential δ(=,v) is additive on v,i . e .
δ(=,v+ w)=δ(=,v)+δ(=,w)
for all = and all games v,w.
Proof. Immediate from the additivity of the Owen value.
Proposition 10 The diﬀerential of any closed path is 0.
Proof. Let = =[ γ0,γ1,...,γm] be a closed path with links [i1,...,im].L e t
[P0,P 1,...,Pm] be their associated coalition structures. We proceed by induc-
tion on m. First, we note that m should be an even number, because each
link il should change his strategy γ(il) an even number of times, so that the
strategy proﬁle goes back to its original position, i.e. γ0 = γm.






For m =4 ,w eh a v e= =[ γ0,γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4] and three cases: a) i1 = i2,
i3 = i4;b )i1 = i3, i2 = i4;a n dc )i1 = i4, i2 = i3. In cases a) and c), we have
two closed paths of length 2, so the diﬀerential is 0.W ep r o v et h er e s u l tf o r
case b) (Figure 2). We can assume without loss of generality that in γ0 both
players play ‘s’.
11Assume we are in a unanimity game uT, and both players belong to the
carrier T. In particular, this implies |Sq ∩ T| ≥ 2.L e tp0 be the number of
coalitions in P0 with nonempty intersection with T. Then, it is well-known











































When one of the players does not belong to the carrier (say, player i1),
then Φi1 (Pγ)=0for any γ and
Φi2 (P0)=Φi2 (P1)=
1




f r o mw h e r ei ti sn o td i ﬃcult to check that δ(=,u T)=0 .
For a general game v =
P





λT (v)δ(=,u T)=0 .
Assume now the result holds for closed paths with less than m strategy





























Figure 3: Each node represents a strategy proﬁle. Each arc represents a link
between two adjacent strategy proﬁles.
his strategy from γ0(i1)=s to γ1(i1)=e.S i n c e= is a closed path, player
i1 should eventually change his strategy from e to s. Namely, there exists
L ∈ {2,...,m} such that i1 = iL, γl (i1)=e for all l =2 ,...,L− 1,a n d
γL(i1)=s.
If L =2 ,t h e nγ2 = γ0.
If L>2, we consider the strategy proﬁle γ0
2 which arises from γ0 when
player i2 makes his change before i1, i.e. γ0
2(i)=γ0(i) for all i 6= i2, γ0
2(i2)=
γ2(i2).N o w , i t i s n o t d i ﬃcult to check that γ0
2 is adjacent to both γ0 and
γ2.P l a y e ri2 is the link between γ0 and γ0
2.P l a y e ri1 is the link between γ2
and γ0
2.L e t γ0
3 be the strategy proﬁle which arises from γ0
2 when player i3
changes his strategy, and so on. We repeat the process until we reach γ0
L−1,
which equals γL (see Figure 3).
Formally, we deﬁne γ0
l for l =2 ,...,L−1 as follows: γ0
l (i)=γl (i) if i 6= i1
and γ0




13for all l.M o r e o v e r ,γ0
L−1 = γL.


























Notice that δ(=,v)=δ(=0,v)+δ(=00,v).M o r e o v e r , =00 has two less
strategy proﬁles than =. Hence, by the induction hypothesis δ(=00,v)=0 .
We show now that δ(=0,v)=0 .I fL =2 , the result is trivial by induction












for all l =2 ,3,...,L − 2. Since they are closed paths of length 4,w eh a v e







An important consequence of Proposition 10 is that there are no cycles
for Φ.
Corollary 11 There are no cycles for Φ.
Proof. Assume there is a cycle =. Then, δ(=,v) is positive, which contra-
dicts Proposition 10.
As another consequence of Proposition 10, we have the following deﬁni-
tion:
Deﬁnition 12 Given two strategy proﬁles γ,γ0,t h ediﬀerential of γ0 with
respect to γ is the diﬀerential of any path from γ to γ0.
14This diﬀerential is well-deﬁned: Assume there are two paths from γ to γ0,
i.e. = = {γ,γ1,γ2,...,γm = γ0} and =0 = {γ,γ0
1,γ0
2,...,γ0
m0 = γ0}. Then, the
closed path =00 = {γ,γ1,γ2,...,γm,γ0
m0−1,...,γ0





Theorem 13 Players, acting myopically, always reach a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We start from a strategy proﬁle γ. Suppose that there exists a player
i ∈ Sq who beneﬁts from changing his strategy γ(i).L e tγ0 be the adjacent
strategy proﬁle (i.e. γ ∼i γ0)a n dl e tPγ and Pγ0 be their respective coalition
structures. Then, φi(Pγ) <φ i(Pγ0) and we deduce that the diﬀerential of
γ0 with respect to γ is positive. Suppose in the new strategy proﬁle there
exists another player j ∈ N who beneﬁts from changing his strategy γ0(j).
Let γ00 be the adjacent strategy proﬁle and let Pγ00 be its respective coalition
structure. Then, φj(Pγ0) <φ j(Pγ00) and the diﬀerential of γ00 with respect
to γ is again positive. We repeat the process with all the players who are
willing to change their strategy. Since the diﬀerential is always positive,
we cannot come back to a previous strategy proﬁle. So, there should be a
strategy proﬁle γm in which no player can improve his payoﬀ by changing his
strategy, i.e. γm is a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 14 There exists a non-panic Nash equilibrium.
Proof. It is an immediate consequence of Lemma 7 and Corollary 11.
4. THE MECHANISM WITH ALL THE COALITIONS
In the previous section, it was assumed that only the players of a ﬁxed
coalition Sq have the chance to exit the coalition. When a coalition negotiate
a common behavior among their members (i.e. decide which of them act as
15a single player), it is natural to assume that the players do so independently
of the other coalitions.
However, one may wonder what happens when all the coalitions play
simultaneously. Thus, we study the following modiﬁcation of the mechanism:
First stage Simultaneously, each player in N announces whether he wants
to stay or to exit his coalition. Given the announcements of each player,
a coalition structure is formed. The players who announced to exit act
as singletons.
Second stage Each player receives his Owen value.
Thus, the set of strategies for each player i is again γ (i) ∈ {s,e}.L e t









The deﬁnitions of a path, a closed path, a link, and the diﬀerential of a
closed path are analogous to those of Section 3. Let γ be a Nash equilibrium.
Then, γ is a panic equilibrium if there exists a coalition Sq ∈ P such that
γ (i)=e for all i ∈ Sq. Notice that, in this case, there are more than one
possible panic equilibrium.
Proposition 15 The diﬀerential of a closed path is not always zero.
Proof. Let N = {1,2,3,4,5} and consider the unanimity game (N,uN).L e t
P = {123|45} and let γ0 =( s,s,s,s,s), γ1 =( e,s,s,s,s), γ2 =( e,s,s,e,s),
γ3 =( s,s,s,e,s),a n dγ4 = γ0. The associated coalition structures are
P0 = P, P1 = {1|23|45}, P2 = {1|23|4|5}, P3 = {123|4|5} and P4 = P,































Let T =[ γ0,γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4] be a closed path. Then, δ(T,v)= 1
36 6=0 .
As the diﬀerential is not zero, we wonder whether there exist non-panic
equilibria. The next example shows that there exist games whose unique
Nash equilibria are the panic equilibria.












This game in monotonic and superadditive 6. Moreover, all Nash equilib-
ria are panic equilibria. For six players, it is tedious to write all the possible
strategy proﬁles. In Figure 4, four of these strategy proﬁles (which form a
cycle) are represented.
17γ = (s,s,s,s,s,s), Pγ = {123|456}
Φ1(Pγ) = 1.92, Φ4(Pγ) = 1.58
γ = (s,s,s,e,s,s), Pγ = {123|4|56}
Φ1(Pγ) = 1.75, Φ4(Pγ) = 1.5
γ = (e,s,s,e,s,s), Pγ = {1|23|4|56}
Φ1(Pγ) = 1.42, Φ4(Pγ) = 1.75
γ = (e,s,s,s,s,s), Pγ = {1|23|456}




Figure 4: A cycle of length 4.
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NOTES
1 European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European De-
mocrats.
2 We use the term mechanism instead of non-cooperative game to avoid
confusion with cooperative games.
3 For simplicity, we write {123|45|6} instead of {{1,2,3},{4,5},{6}},
and so on.
4 I thank María Montero for proposing this example.
5 We write 146 instead of {1,4,6},a n ds oo n .
6 Ag a m ev is monotonic if v(S) ≤ v(T) for all S ⊂ T,a n dsuperadditive
if v(S)+v(T) ≤ v(S ∪ T) for all S,T with S ∩ T = ∅.
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